This article has been prepared as an entry for the Wiley Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences (Update). It gives a brief overview of fundamental properties and applications of conditional independence.
In this article we consider the fundamental properties and uses of the conditional independence relation, broadly understood; and give a number of examples of statistical interest.
The idea of treating probabilistic independence as a basic intuitive concept, with its own formal rules, was rst proposed in (1979) by Dawid 3] . Some technical aspects were addressed in 5]. Similar ideas were introduced at about the same time by Spohn 26] , motivated by the problem of explicating probabilis- 
PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONAL INDEPEN-DENCE
For random variables X, Y , Z on a probability space ( ; F), and P a distribution on ( ; F), we may write X? ?Y jZ P] to denote that, under P, X and Y are conditionally independent, given Z. When Z is trivial this becomes simple independence of X and Y , written as X? ?Y P]. We can omit the quali cation P] when this is clear.
The usual de nition of X? ?Y jZ is in terms of the factorisation of the condi-tional joint distribution of (X; Y ) given Z: for measurable A, B, P(X 2 A; Y 2 BjZ) = P(X 2 AjZ)P(Y 2 BjZ); (1) almost surely. A mathematically equivalent property, which is more intuitive, is P(X 2 AjY; Z) = P(X 2 AjZ) (2) almost surely. This in turn is equivalent to the existence of some function a(Z) (depending on A) such that P(X 2 AjY; Z) = a(Z); (3) almost surely.
We can interpret (2) as saying that, once Z is given, uncertainty about X is una ected on learning Y . That is, as alternatively expressed by (3) , Y is irrelevant to uncertainty about X, once Z is given. Note that, unlike (1) , in which X and Y enter symmetrically, in (2) and (3) all three terms X, Y and Z have distinct rôles.
STATISTICAL EXTENSIONS
The basic intuition of \irrelevance" has important applications to Statistics, beyond pure Probability Theory. Thus let X arise from a distribution P 2 P, labelled by a parameter , and let T be a su cient statistic. The intuition behind su ciency is that, once T is given, knowledge of the parameter is irrelevant to the remaining uncertainty about the full data X; and this is an intuitively meaningful statement even though need not be regarded as random. More formally, su ciency means that there exist versions of the conditional distribution for X given T under , which are the same for every value of , and this assertion is essentially property (3), with Y and Z replaced, respectively, by and T. (Some care is needed over the interpretation of \almost surely" in this context: see Dawid 5] ). Thus we might fruitfully express su ciency as a conditional independence property, written X? ? jT P], or, if P is understood, simply as X? ? jT.
Similarly, suppose S is an ancillary statistic in the above model, meaning that the distribution of S is the same for all . Then knowledge of is irrelevant to uncertainty about S, a property which can be captured by the (unconditional) independence assertion S? ? .
Again, we could write X? ? j to express the property that a function of is a \su cient parameter" for the distributions of X, being all that one need specify in order to determine the distribution of X, other aspects of being unidenti able.
We see then that a number of fundamental statistical concepts can be intuitively understood in terms of conditional independence, and can be formally manipulated using the general theory described below. Note that, in these statistical extensions, there is no meaningful interpretation of X? ? jT of the form (1), since is not a random variable; hence the symmetry of probabilistic CI is absent. Likewise, (2) is meaningless (unless, assuming (3), we regard it as de ning its right-hand side). However, as soon as we complement the statistical model with a prior distribution for , we do obtain a joint distribution P for (X; ).
Then su ciency immediately implies X? ? jT P], and hence, by the symmetry of probabilistic CI, ? ?XjT P]. According to (3) , this asserts that the posterior distribution of depends on X only through the value of T; further, from (2), it is the same as the posterior distribution that would be obtained if only T were observed. Thus, out of seemingly trivial manipulations, we can derive important conclusions.
In similar fashion, we can express and manipulate many other important It is possible to derive many further properties of CI by regarding P1 to P5 as axioms for a logical system, rather than calling on any more speci c properties of probability distributions. A simple example 3] is the following, which expresses the \nearest neighbour" property of a Markov Chain: Natural CI This model arises in a theory of \deterministic epistemology " 27, 31] , where the plausibility of an event (an arbitrary subset of a sample space )
is measured by a \natural conditional function" : ! f0; 1; : : :g. We assume that ?1 (0) is non-empty, and interpret points in this set as \fully plausible".
Points in ?1 (n) are regarded as \implausible to degree n". (Informally, we can regard such points as having probability of the order of n , for some in nitesimally Other models There are numerous other mathematical and logical systems in which it is possible to introduce a relation ? ? obeying P1{P5, or variants thereof. the speci c properties of the underlying distribution P. Alternatively we could restrict attention to the class of P for which P6 holds for the random variables under consideration; in particular, this will always be so if the sample space is discrete, with P(f!g) > 0, all ! 2 .
GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS
A model of P1{P6 has been termed a graphoid by Pearl 20] , on account of its similarity to the following important special case. The importance of such a graphical model of the axioms is that it can be used as a \theorem-proving machine", as follows. Let X = (X v : v 2 V ) be a collection of random variables satisfying the graphoid axioms (e.g. de ned on a discrete sample space with everywhere positive probabilities 
